Abstract Failure of medical device (MD) software can have potentially catastrophic effects, leading to injury of patients or even death. Therefore, regulators penalise MD manufacturers who do not demonstrate that sufficient attention is devoted to the areas of hazard analysis and risk management (RM) throughout the software lifecycle. This paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to compare how thorough current MD regulations are with relation to the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI Ò ) in specifying what RM practices MD companies should adopt when developing software. The second objective is to present a Risk Management Capability Model (RMCM) for the MD software industry, which is geared towards improving software quality, safety and reliability. Our analysis indicates that 42 RM sub-practices would have to be performed in order to satisfy MD regulations and that only an additional 8 sub-practices would be required in order to satisfy all the CMMI Ò level 1 requirements. Additionally, MD companies satisfying the CMMI Ò goals of the RM process area by performing the CMMI Ò RM practices will not meet the requirements of the MD software RM regulations as an additional 20 MD-specific sub-practices have to be added to meet the objectives of RMCM.
Introduction
Software is becoming an increasingly important aspect of medical devices and MD regulation. Software enables highly complex systems to be built. However, complexity is the enemy of safety (McDermid 1993) , therefore, strict adherence to well-documented processes is important within the domain of MD software. Medical devices can only be marketed if compliance and approval from the appropriate regulatory bodies of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (FDA/CDRH 2005; FDA Regulations 2006; FDA/CDRH 1999) (US requirement) , and the European Commission under its Medical Device Directives (MDD) (European Council 1993) (CE marking requirement) is achieved. MD companies must produce a design history file detailing the software components and processes undertaken in the development of their products. Due to the safety-critical nature of MD software, it is important that a highly efficient RM process is in place within MD companies. The risk of patient injury from software defects is a concern due to the manufacture and deployment of increasing numbers of software-embedded devices (Bassen et al. 1985; Crumpler and Rudolph 1997; Munsey 1995; US General Accounting Office 1997) . There have been a number of major MD product recalls over this past 25 years that were the result of software defects (Bovee et al. 2001) . For example, in October 2006, it was discovered that software flaws caused errors in the battery indicators of Identity pacemakers, also more serious Class I recalls have plagued infusion pump manufacturers; in June 2007, a manufacturer had to recall the 4,500 systems, it had purportedly fixed because a software bug inappropriately stopped infusion in the updated devices; and in February 2007, a Class I recall of automatic external defibrillators was also software related (Medical Devices Today 2007) . Additionally, four people died and two were left permanently disfigured from massive radiation overdoses due to software defects in the Therac-25 line of medical linear accelerators (Leveson and Turner 1993) . A major contributor to such defects is the presence of software quality assurance issues (Bassen et al. 1985) . The CDRH reviewed MD recalls due to software failures from 1983 to 1991 and estimated that 90% were due to inadequate design and 19% were caused by inadequate change control (US Department of Health and Human Services 1992) . Therefore, to reduce the risk of failure, it is important that the software design process includes efficient RM practices.
Software quality may be defined and measured in many ways. For MD companies, one way to define and measure software quality is in terms of the risk of software-containing devices in exposing patients, operators, bystanders, service personnel or the environment to hazards. Although such devices are developed to increase the well-being of patients, on occasion they fail to operate properly, or are misused in ways that are associated with injuries and death (Rados 2003) . According to the Institute of Medicine report 'To Err is Human' (Kohn et al. 2000) , between 44,000 and 98,000 people die throughout the world in hospital from preventative medical errors. The report also says that more people die every year as a result of medical errors than from motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer or AIDS.
MD companies are responsible for ensuring that they take adequate precautions to produce safe and effective software that does not pose a severe hazard should a softwarerelated failure occur. Therefore, MD companies who market within the USA must ensure that they comply with the regulations for medical devices outlined by the FDA. They must also be able to produce sufficient evidence to support this compliance. The FDA ''is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficiency and security of…medical devices…' ' (FDA's Mission Statement 2007) . To this end, the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) has published guidance papers for industry and MD staff which include risk-based activities to be performed during software validation (FDA/CDRH 1999), pre-market submission (FDA/CDRH 2005) and while using off-theshelf (OTS) software in a MD (FDA Regulations 2006) . Although the CDRH guidance documents provide information on which software activities should be performed, including risk-based activities, they do not enforce any specific method for performing these activities.
Within the MD industry, several predominant standards have emerged for performing risk-based activities including: ISO:14971 (ISO 2007) and SW68 (AAMI 2001 ) and more recently IEC:62304 (IEC 2006) , which is based on SW68 and aims to both improve upon and replace SW68. Previous research has asserted that both ISO:14971 and SW68 require that RM activities include software, without providing any detail on how it should be done (AAMI 2005; AAMI 2004) . In 2005, the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) produced a Technical Information Report (TIR32) (AAMI 2004) on performing risk-based activities in accordance with ISO:14971 to help rectify this situation. The report focuses on ''software system safety design issues'' and provides insight into the key concepts behind performing various risk-based activities. It also highlights many of the pitfalls associated with RM activities. However, TIR32 does all this without committing to specific methods or documentation requirements when performing the various activities. It clearly states that it ''does not define any specific documentation requirements''. Likewise, the International Society for Pharmaceutical Engineering (ISPE) published a guide, GAMP 4 (ISPE 2001), which included guidance for performing validation of software systems and risk-based activities. The guide provides many of the RM high-level concepts with some detail and practical examples. It falls short in that it does not cover all the requirements necessary to achieve full compliance in the area of RM.
None of the standards or guides produced provides a one-stop-shop for MD software risk-based activities making it harder for MD companies to quickly measure their capability with respect to software RM. Although IEC:62304 acknowledges that risk is very well addressed in ISO:14971, it points out that there is a need for additional RM requirements to address software-specific requirements. IEC:62304 addresses these additional requirements but does so in the context of ISO:14971. It is only through combining the various standards that one may gain a complete picture of what is required for software RM.
This paper outlines a proposed RMCM for use by MD companies to assist them in producing safe and effective software. It seeks to extract, interpret and combine the disparate knowledge within the MD industry and associated standards. It does so in the context of the following regulations: ISO:14971, IEC:62304, TIR32, BS/EN:60601-1-4 (BS/EN 2000) and GAMP 4, in addition to the CDRH (FDA-specific) guidance documents.
Section 2 examines the need for the RMCM and how similar software process improvement (SPI)-based models have been used within other safety-critical software industries. Section 3 presents an overview of the RMCM. Section 4 describes the development of the RMCM. Section 5 details the mappings that were performed between the MD regulations and the CMMI Ò (SEI 2006) for RM. This section describes the content of the RMCM including the capability level structure. It details what additional practices have to be added to the CMMI Ò RM process area in order to satisfy MD regulations, as well as what CMMI Ò practices are not required in order to satisfy basic MD regulatory requirements. Commentary is supplied indicating how the RM process adopted by MD companies could benefit by incorporating CMMI Ò practices that are not deemed necessary by MD regulations. Section 6 details a summary of the results from the research. Finally, Sect. 7 presents our conclusions.
Background and the contribution of this research
MD companies have to adhere to MD regulations in relation to RM. The main area of concern for MD companies in relation to RM is to ensure that the RM elements required by the FDA are in place rather than trying to improve their overall RM practices. The majority of the literature available on MD RM discusses RM from a high-level perspective where some of the key concepts of RM are discussed (Wood 1999; Schmuland 2005; Elahi 1993 ) and the FDA's role in the regulation of MD software is examined (Rados 2003; Rudolph 2003; Kim 1993; Theisen and Neill 2004; Ciarkowski 2000; Munzer 1988 ). The literature's focus is on what is and what can be done by the FDA to prevent MD manufacturers from releasing unsafe medical devices.
Much has been done in the area of user-centred design (Johnson et al. 2005 ) and how poor user interface design can render software applications unusable or lead to incorrect diagnosis of patients due to missing or incorrect information that is important to the diagnosis of the patient (Bates et al. 1999; Tang and Patel 1994; Tierney et al. 1987) . In fact, the FDA views this as a critical issue (Sawyer et al. 1996) and has produced a guide specifically aimed at addressing human interface concerns through the design process (FDA/CDRH 2000) . Through such guidance, it is hoped that the design of software will be driven by safety conscious decisions and consideration for potential human misinterpretation of results and misuse or abuse of the system, thus leading to safer software. The consideration of how software may potentially be used or misused is one of several important practices required for any software RM model.
Other literature has focussed on the progression of the FDA in the regulation of MD software (Kim 1993; Eagles and Murray 2001) . This literature is interesting in that it presents the progression of key standards aimed at the MD sector from the perspective of the FDA. It provides a good insight into the evolution of standards and establishes a number of core standards within MD RM.
Wallace and Kuhn have conducted research into the reasons why MD software fails or has been recalled by the FDA (Wallace and Kuhn 2001) . The research analyses over 15 years of recall data and discusses how the majority of MD errors are preventative by providing examples of prevention and detection techniques. The research does not directly discuss hazard analysis and RM but is useful in that it does discuss many of the techniques which are associated with risk mitigation such as inspections and reviews, traceability, code reviews, use of simulations, unit testing and interface testing. Through the examination of recall data, the researchers provided some lessons into why MD software fails and how these failures can be prevented.
Other research has been conducted into formal techniques for quantifying reliability of MD software and analysing risks associated with the devices (Voas et al. 1993; Sayre et al. 2001) . Again, this research is seen as complimentary to analysing MD software and producing safer software but is not, and does not claim to be, a complete replacement for existing RM practices.
The MD industry itself has identified the requirement for a guide and for practical examples for performing relevant MD software practices including RM. GAMP 4 details RM practices that MD companies may adopt in order to comply with MD regulations. However, no standards exist within the MD domain in relation to how such practices could be improved by incorporating practices from formal software engineering SPI models for RM. Previous research has investigated the suitability of using existing software quality assurance standards in order to achieve FDA compliance related to the areas of process management, requirements specification, design control and change control (Bovee et al. 2001 ).
However, the area of RM was not investigated, and no specific SPI model has been developed for the industry.
If we investigate other regulated industries such as the automotive and space industries, we realise that these domains are not content with satisfying regulatory standards. Instead, they have proactively developed SPI models specifically for their domain, so that they may continuously improve the development of their information systems to achieve higher levels of safety, greater efficiency and a faster time to market, whilst seamlessly satisfying regulatory quality requirements. The major SPI models that currently exist, namely ISO/ IEC:15504 (ISO/IEC 2003) and CMMI Ò , do not address the regulatory requirements of either the MD, automotive or space industries. Therefore, a new SPI model was developed specifically for the automotive industry. This model was based upon ISO/IEC:15504 and is referred to as Automotive Spice (Automotive SIG 2005) . Likewise, a new ISO/IEC:15504-based SPI model was developed specifically for the space industry-this model is known as SPiCE for SPACE (Cass and Volcker 2000) . Both of these models contain reference and assessment information in relation to how companies may improve their RM practices within their domain. This paper will not address the issue of developing an entire SPI model for the MD industry [a high-level structure for such a model is discussed in (Mc Caffery et al. 2005a, b; Mc Caffery and Coleman 2007) ], but shall, instead, focus upon the individual process area of RM [this research extends the research presented in (Mc Caffery et al. 2005a, b; Burton et al. 2006) ]. This work develops a SPI model for RM within the MD industry, providing an opportunity to integrate the regulatory issues and SPI mechanisms to achieve improvements that are critical to the RM of software for medical devices.
Overview of the RMCM
The RMCM outlined in this paper was developed following an extensive literature review and input from a MD company. The primary focus of the research area as a whole is to investigate if the MD regulations for RM may be improved through adopting disciplined software engineering practices. This paper describes an integral part of this research by detailing the development of a RMCM that is based upon a formal SPI model. Upon development, the RMCM will be an extension of the RM process area within the CMMI Ò . This is specifically tailored to fulfil the RM regulations of the MD software industry. The RMCM may then be adopted by MD companies to improve their software development practices by providing them with a SPI model. This SPI model will also ensure that their hazard analysis and risk control procedures satisfy the current MD regulations and guidelines.
The development of the RMCM
The RMCM was developed following a request from a MD company who is bound legally by the regulatory bodies of the British Standards Institution (BSI) and the FDA (FDA/ CDRH 2002). The regulatory bodies regularly review this organisation's process and procedures, through audits, to ensure that the organisation is compliant with the regulations set out by the bodies. Therefore, the organisation possessed a solid base of documented process and audit feedback.
The organisation requested that a model should be created with a comprehensive and reusable software hazard analysis and RM procedure. It was a requirement that the procedures should fully comply with the RM requirements set forth by both the FDA and BSI. It was envisaged that this would lead to safer and more efficient software design and developed device. It was also desirable that the resulting RM framework would satisfy the regulatory requirements of other regulatory bodies (if applicable). Therefore, the focus and content of the resulting framework could not be restricted to just FDA and BSI guidance documents.
In order to understand and define the scope of the RMCM, it was important that the authors gained both a broad and deep understanding of the concepts of RM in both the MD domain and the software engineering community. The approach adopted was to perform an extensive literature review of existing regulatory guidance papers, industry guidance papers and standards which govern the MD software industry as well as SPI models from other industry sectors. This in turn provided a solid and proven foundation upon which the model could be based.
Structure of RMCM
The RMCM does not dictate a software lifecycle model. It assumes the existence of software phases common to industry standard lifecycle models. The phases include requirements management, design and development, verification and validation, release, maintenance and post-production. Neither quality nor safety can be integrated into software as a final step in the software development process. MD companies must take an approach which integrates hazard management and risk analysis into the entire software lifecycle. This should begin at the requirements phase and continue through to product retirement. The approach taken must clearly demonstrate that serious consideration was given to all possible hazards posed by MD software. It must put in place appropriate risk reduction and mitigation techniques.
The RMCM has been designed to be flexible in that relevant elements of the model may be adopted as required to provide the most significant benefit to the business. The model is based on the CMMI Ò and the regulations used to extend the CMMI Ò framework are those of the FDA, ISO:14971, GAMP 4 and the IEC: 62304 standard (MD software-Software life cycle processes). EN 6061-1-4 (BS EN 2000) was also considered for the RMCM to establish if there was additional knowledge within the standard which would complement the model. Such information has been highlighted by the authors during the discussion of the models sub-practices in the subsequent sections.
The RMCM contains an assessment method that provides a means of assessing the software engineering capability for the RM process area in relation to MD software (both application and embedded software). The RMCM is being developed as a foundation upon which to promote SPI practices into the RM process adopted by MD companies. This is an attempt to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of RM within MD companies through investigating the mapping of MD regulatory guidelines against the CMMI Ò RM process area. The mappings between the MD regulatory guidelines and the CMMI Ò specific practices for the RM process result in the RMCM being composed of a number of goals and practices. Goals and practices may be either generic (relating to the entire organisation) or specific (relating directly to the RM process). The RMCM determines what parts of the CMMI Ò RM process area (i.e. part A of Fig. 1 ) are required to satisfy MD regulations (i.e. part B of Fig. 1 ).
The RMCM also investigates the possibility of extending the CMMI Ò process areas with additional practices that are outside the remit of CMMI Ò but are required in order to satisfy MD regulatory guidelines (i.e. part C of Fig. 1) . Additionally, the RMCM provides MD companies with the opportunity to incorporate practices from the CMMI Ò that are not required in order to achieve regulatory compliance but that would greatly enhance their RM process if they were included (i.e. part D of Fig. 1 ). RMCM will help companies to measure their organisational RM capability and to track their progression against the following SPI capability levels:
• RMCM Level Med-Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy the goals and perform the practices required to meet the requirements of the various MD regulatory guidelines and standards associated with RM. This will involve performing some practices, which the CMMI Ò views as generic, although not to the extent of fulfilling any generic goals.
• RMCM Level 0-Insufficient practices have been performed to satisfy the requirements of Level Med.
• RMCM Level 1-Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy RMCM level Med and the CMMI Ò capability level 1 goal of performing the CMMI Ò RM base practices.
• RMCM Level 2-Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy RMCM level 1 and additionally perform CMMI Ò RM Advanced Practices, as well as the CMMI Ò capability level 2 generic goal of institutionalising a Managed Process.
• RMCM Level 3-Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy RMCM level 2 and additionally the CMMI Ò Generic Goal to Institutionalise a Defined Process (CMMI Ò Generic Goal 3) for the RM process area.
• RMCM Level 4-Companies must demonstrate that they satisfy RMCM level 3 and additionally the CMMI Ò Generic Goal to Institutionalise a Quantitatively Managed Process (CMMI Ò Generic Goal 4) for the RM process area.
• RMCM Level 5-Companies must demonstrate that a process area satisfies RMCM level 4 and additionally the CMMI Ò Generic Goal to Institutionalise an Optimising Process (CMMI Ò Generic Goal 5) for the RM process area.
Section 5 details a mapping of the MD standards and guidelines (these shall be referred to as MD regulations throughout the paper) to the CMMI Ò for the RMCM. This will demonstrate what CMMI Ò goals and practices are required in order to satisfy MD regulations for RM. Software development within MD companies could be improved by incorporating other CMMI Ò practices that are not required to achieve MD compliance. Details are provided in relation to how additional sub-practices (not included in the ) may be added where necessary to satisfy MD regulatory guidelines. RM goals and practices have to be performed to satisfy each of the RMCM capability levels.
RMCM goals, practices and sub-practices
In this section, we identify the goals that exist within the RMCM. Tables will be used to illustrate the complete list of the RMCM practices and sub-practices for a particular goal. The tables also specify the RMCM capability level associated with each sub-practice. Subpractices that are displayed in bold italics in the tables are not present in the CMMI Ò but are required in order to fulfil MD regulatory requirements.
The RM process area has three specific goals (SG):
• SG1: Prepare for RM • SG2: Identify and Analyse Risks • SG3: Mitigate Risks
For each of these goals to be achieved, it is necessary for a number of specific practices (SP) to be performed.
SG1: prepare for RM
In order to fulfil SG1: Prepare for RM, the specific practices of Determine Risk Sources and Categories; Define Risk Parameters; and Establish a RM Strategy must be performed. (For a more complete description of these sub-practices, please refer to the RM process area section within the CMMI Ò (SEI 2006)). Table 1 provides the complete list of the RMCM sub-practices and their associated capability level for preparing for RM. Table 2 summaries the mapping of the MD RM regulations against specific goal 1 of the CMMI Ò RM process area (Prepare for RM). It may be observed that 10 MD-specific subpractices will have to be performed in addition to all the CMMI Ò RM practices and subpractices in order to satisfy the MD guidelines of this goal. However, the CMMI Ò specific goal 1 for RM would be fully satisfied by following guidelines required to adhere to MD regulations. Table 2 illustrates that the RMCM practice for determining risk sources and categories items consists of 2 sub-practices that are required by both the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations (i.e. Level Med in Table 1 ), plus 3 new sub-practices that are required by the MD regulations but not by the CMMI Ò (i.e. Level Med in Table 1 ).
Determine risk sources and categories
5.1.1.1 Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations (see Table 1 ) Sub-practices 4 & 5. Determining the potential sources of risk and categorising them as activities that are required by both the CMMI Ò and the MD guidelines (see Table 1 ). However, the MD regulations require additional information in relation to factors that could result in software hazards. FDA guidelines recommend focusing upon safety as a primary source of risk. Other typical sources of risk that the MD guidelines recommend focusing upon are: cost, integrity and security. FDA guidelines also note that risk may be initiated by human factors, hardware faults, software faults, integration errors and environmental conditions. MD guidelines also recommend that all potential causes and sequences of events that could result in a hazard should be documented.
Risks should be organised into related groups as this will assist with consolidating subpractices in risk mitigation plans. A number of factors may be considered when determining risk categories. FDA guidelines advise similar factors to those recommended by the CMMI Ò , such as categorising risk for an entity, as well as for major components, subsystems, software, electronics and lifecycle stages. For example, FDA regulations stress that it is important to define risk-related functions when analysing requirements and to Table 1 ) Three additional MD-specific sub-practices as defined in IEC: 62304 were added in order to provide full coverage of the MD regulations. These are as follows:
Sub-practice 1. The MD regulations identify hazard management as part of RM and request that hazards should be identified that could be the direct result of software failure or for which software implements a control measure. The MD perspective of risk management and hazard analysis differs from Nancy Leveson's definitions (Leveson 1995) in that hazard analysis appears subservient to risk management, however, in the RMCM, we place a lot of emphasis on hazard analysis as it provides focus for the subsequent practices of the RMCM that include the identification of risks that could give rise to those hazards. Hazards should be identified from both normal and incorrect use of the software device and should be considered for patients, operators, service personnel, bystanders and the environment. EN 60601-1-4 recommends that the method used for hazard identification should be documented in the RM file (IEC 1985) .
Sub-practice 2. The MD regulations specify that OTS (off-the-shelf) software must be considered as a potential source for failure of MD software. IEC:62304 specifically requires that where software of unknown provenance (SOUP) is used in the MD software, any published SOUP anomaly list be evaluated to determine if any new hazards could be introduced as a result of the known anomalies.
Sub-practice 3. The MD regulations detail that hardware failures should be considered as a potential source of software failures. Table 2 illustrates that the RMCM practice for defining risk parameters consists of 3 subpractices that are required by both the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations. Therefore, the MD guidelines demand similar effort and rigour to those demanded by CMMI Ò and a company satisfying MD regulations would also satisfy the specific practice for defining risk parameters.
Define risk parameters

Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI
Ò and the MD regulations (see Table 1 ) Sub-Practice 6. It is important to identify criteria that may be used for comparing risks and enabling risks to be prioritised. ISO:14971 guidelines identify parameters for the severity of harm (should the risk occur) and the likelihood of the occurrence for quantifying risk. These criteria may be acceptable in the instance where a hardware failure may lead to a corresponding software failure and the likelihood can be reasonably estimated. However, IEC:62304, states that for software, if a hazard could arise from the failure of the software, the probability of such a failure shall be assumed to be 100 per cent. Software safety is broken into three classes A, B and C. Class A represents a software item where failure would not result in injury or damage to health, B could result in non-serious injury and C could result in death or serious injury. All software items are assigned a classification and all software items within a system are assumed to inherit the system's safety class until they themselves have been evaluated. Any unclassified software items assume a class level C. Many of the software lifecycle activities and associated tasks within IEC:62304 are directly linked to these software classifications. Sub-Practice 7. The MD company must define thresholds against which all identified risks shall be measured.
Sub-Practice 8. As safety is of primary importance, companies must ensure that medical devices are produced that satisfy acceptable levels of risk. In terms of developing software for medical devices the parameter values for 'severity of harm' are very important and are defined and justified by the sponsor. The degree of detail and effort involved in RM and control should be in line with the 'severity of the resulting consequences' (should failure happen). Therefore, most effort should be devoted to handling risks that have a 'severity of harm' level of major (Class C). 'Probability of occurrence' of the risk is also important and is used to determine the overall risk classification. However, in software, it can be difficult to accurately establish the probability of occurrence of software-related risks or software faults that give rise to risks. Therefore, in instances where the probability of occurrence cannot be accurately gauged, the risk should be assigned the highest level of likelihood of occurrence such that the primary focus of the risk mitigation becomes reducing the severity of the harm. In instances where the probability of occurrence can be accurately gauged, risk mitigation can also focus on reducing that likelihood as a means of reducing the overall risk classification. Table 2 illustrates that the MD regulations are more stringent in terms of what constitutes a RM strategy and, therefore, additional sub-practices (other than those detailed in the CMMI Ò ) will have to be included within this practice in order to fulfil the objectives of RMCM. For example, the FDA guidelines specify that a strategy should include: potential sources of risk; appropriate techniques for risk analysis of software, electronics, biomaterials etc., such as fault tree analysis, failure modes and effects analysis; risk criteria, parameters and thresholds; risk control methods; & activities used to monitor the risks and whether risk controls were successful (FDA Regulations 2006). Table 1 demonstrates that the RMCM practice for establishing a RM strategy consists of one sub-practice that is required by both the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations (i.e. Level Med), and 7 sub-practices that are required by the MD regulations but not by the CMMI Ò (i.e. Level Med).
Establish RM strategy
5.1.3.1 Sub-practice required by BOTH the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations (see Table 1 ) Sub-Practice 9. Establishing a RM strategy involves establishing and maintaining a strategy to be used for RM. Both CMMI Ò and the FDA require companies to have a RM strategy that is used to define risk analysis and control activities, which should be documented. EN 60601-1-4 adds that if the plan/strategy changes during the course of development, a record of the changes shall be kept. MD guidelines require that a RM strategy is adopted and request that MD manufacturers document: an analysis of intended use of MD and software, a description of each identified risk; the severity level of the risk; the source of the risk; the risk control methods used and how they were implemented; tests used to confirm the success of the risk method used; and the severity level after the risk control method has been implemented. 5.1.3.2 Sub-practices required by the MD regulations but NOT by the CMMI (see Table 1 ) Sub-Practice 10. To satisfy ISO:14971, the life cycle phases for which the RM plan is applicable, should be identified and described within the plan.
Sub-Practice 11. To satisfy ISO:14971, before a risk is deemed acceptable, it must be measured against a pre-defined acceptability policy, which should be outlined by the RM plan. MD standards do not define acceptable levels and instead leave the decision to the MD manufacturer, who in turn must document their decision using existing standards, comparable levels of risk from devices in use, medical references and clinical study references where available.
Sub-Practice 12. To satisfy ISO:14971, the verification plan and activities should be included as part of the RM plan.
Sub-Practice 13. To satisfy ISO:14971, those responsible for the various RM and control activities should also be identified.
Sub-Practice 14. To satisfy ISO:14971, the plan should also cover the requirements for reviewing the RM activities.
Sub-Practice 15. To satisfy IEC:62304, the RM plan should cover (off-the-shelf) OTS software.
Sub-Practice 16. ISO:14971, IEC:62304 and the FDA guidelines recommend that postproduction queries and bugs should be analysed to safeguard against a risk scenario arising post-release that was not originally considered during development.
SG2: identify and analyse risks
In order to fulfil SG2: Identify and Analyse Risks, the following specific practices have to be performed: Identify risks; & Evaluate, categorise, and Prioritise risks (see Table 3 ). Table 4 summaries the mapping of the MD RM regulations against specific goal 2 (Identify and Analyse Risks) of the CMMI Ò RM process area. It may be observed that in order to satisfy the MD regulations that not all of sub-practices of this CMMI Ò goal will have to be performed. However, in order to satisfy the objectives of the RMCM 4, additional sub-practices have to be added (Table 3) . Table 3 also illustrates that specific goal 2 of the CMMI Ò will not be satisfied by following the MD regulations (i.e. performing only the RMCM level Med sub-practices) as only 4 of the 9 CMMI Ò sub-practices associated with this CMMI Ò goal are required for RMCM level Med. Table 3 includes the complete list of RMCM sub-practices for identifying risks. From mapping the MD regulations against the CMMI Ò for identifying risks, it was discovered that unlike the specific goal 1 practices, not all of the CMMI Ò sub-practices are required in order to achieve MD compliance (i.e. 5 of the 6 CMMI Ò sub-practices are at level 1).
Identify risks
However, the MD regulations request additional information in relation to usage, traceability and the participation of a software development team member in the RM activity. Therefore, additional MD-specific sub-practices are required in order to achieve the objectives of the RMCM. Table 4 illustrates that the RMCM practice for identifying risks consists of 1 sub-practice that is required by both the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations (i.e. Level Med), 3 sub-practices that are required by the MD regulations but not by the CMMI (i.e. Level Med), and 5 sub-practices that are required by the CMMI Ò but not by the MD regulations (i.e. Level 1).
Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI
Ò and the MD regulations (see Table 3 ) Sub-Practice 22. Identified risks should be documented. However, prior to identifying the risks, ISO:14971 requires all characteristics that could affect safety to be documented. The acceptable level of residual risk will depend upon the intended purpose of the MD. The documentation should include a description of the identified risk (details of the context and conditions) and the severity of the risk (potential consequences) should it occur. Table 3 ) Sub-Practice 17. To satisfy ISO:14971, MD companies should assess the effect the risk will have upon patients, operators, bystanders, service personnel and the environment. Sub-Practice 23. ISO:14971, IEC:62304 and the FDA guidelines recommend that, as development progresses through the software development lifecycle, the status of existing risks should be updated and new risks should be identified. Risks should be identified for all predictable instances and follow established procedures, starting at the requirements stage of the lifecycle. MD regulations also request that the documentation should identify traceability from the device level down to the specific cause in the software and also provide traceability from the risk analysis, evaluation, implementation and verification down to the final assessment of the acceptability of residual risks.
Sub-practices required by the MD regulations but NOT by the CMMI (see
Sub-Practice 25. ISO: 14971 specifies management must provide an adequate provision of qualified resources. Those performing risk analysis should possess knowledge and experience of the MD, its intended use and RM techniques. Additionally, records of these qualifications should be maintained for future compliance inspection. The risk report should contain the identity of the person and organisation that carried out the risk analysis along with the date of the analysis. The IEC:62304 and ISO:14971 requirements are not as comprehensive as CMMI Ò , as they do not specify that each risk is assigned an owner. Therefore, a separate subpractice is added to RMCM to reflect both IEC:62304 and ISO:14971 guidelines.
Sub-practices required by the CMMI
Ò but NOT by the MD regulations (see Table 3 ) Sub-Practice 18. Many factors that contribute to risk such as cost, integrity, security and safety should be considered.
Sub-Practice 19. In addition to identifying software-related issues, risks should also be identified for hardware faults and integration issues. The CMMI Ò acknowledges that it is important to review areas that are outside the scope of the project for risks.
Sub-Practices 20 & 21. The CMMI Ò requires that all elements of both the work breakdown structure and the project plan should be reviewed to ensure that all aspects of the work effort and project are considered. There is no necessity to review the work breakdown structure and the project plan in order to achieve MD compliance for RM. Sub-Practices 24. The CMMI Ò requires that stakeholders should be associated with each risk so that individuals are assigned responsibility for risks. However, this is not necessary for MD regulatory compliance. Table 3 includes the complete list of RMCM sub-practices and associated capability levels for evaluating, categorising and prioritising risks. From mapping the MD regulations against the CMMI Ò for this practice, we noted that the MD regulatory requirements exceed those of the CMMI Ò , as ISO:14971 additionally requests that the results of all the RM subpractices should be recorded and maintained in a RM file. Therefore, in order to fulfil the objectives of the RMCM, one extra sub-practice is required in addition to those demanded by CMMI Ò (see Table 3 ). A company fulfilling MD regulations would also satisfy the CMMI Ò requirements for this practice. Table 3 illustrates that the RMCM practice for evaluating, categorising and prioritising risks consists of 3 sub-practices that are required by both the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations (i.e. Level Med), and 1 sub-practice that is required by the MD regulations but not by the CMMI Ò (i.e. Level Med). Table 3 ) Sub-Practice 26. Parameters defined in the RM strategy are used to evaluate identified risks. MD companies adhering to FDA guidelines are required to determine risk using the parameters of ''severity of harm'' (should the risk occur) and the ''likelihood of occurrence''. Emphasis is placed on the ''severity of harm'' parameter, as it may not always be possible to accurately estimate the software failure rate (which is directly related to the ''likelihood of occurrence'' parameter).
Evaluate, categorise, prioritise risks
Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations (see
Sub-Practice 27. There is a necessity to group risks according to defined risk categories (e.g. entity, components/subsystems, software etc.) to assist risk handling.
Sub-Practice 28. As a project may have multiple risks, it is important that risks are prioritised, so that the highest priority risks receive the most attention and effort. MD guidelines specify that risks should be prioritised according to the severity of the resulting consequences and that the amount of effort devoted to creating design solutions that reduce or eliminate the risk should be based upon the value of this parameter. GAMP 4 combines the risk classification with the probability of detection to further prioritise the risk. The probability of detection is broken out into three levels: ''low'' where the detection of the fault condition is perceived to be unlikely, ''medium'' where detection is reasonably likely and ''high'' where detection of the fault is very likely. The logic is that risks that are not easily detected are the most vulnerable. Therefore, they become higher priority and should be dealt with first. For example, a medium level risk with a low probability of detection would be deemed high priority due to the low detection rate. In contrast, a medium level risk with a high probability of detection would be a low priority risk. By focussing on the higher priority areas first, the quality of the system is improved by reducing the overall probability of failure. Table 3 ) Sub-Practice 29. ISO:14971 requests that the results of all the RM activities should be recorded and maintained in a RM file. EN 60601-1-4 suggests that a RM summary file should also be created to summarise the RM activities. The RM summary file contains each identified hazard, its initiating cause, mitigation techniques used to control risk and an evaluation of effectiveness of the risk controls. Because the RM file will already contain this information, the summary report is seen by the authors as useful but not a necessity and as such has not been highlighted as a separate sub-practice.
Sub-practices required by the MD regulations but NOT by the CMMI (see
SG3 mitigate risks
In order to fulfil SG3: Mitigate Risks, the following specific practices have to be performed: Develop Risk Mitigation Plans & Implement Risk Mitigation Plans (see Table 5 ). Table 6 summarises the mapping of the MD RM regulations against CMMI Ò specific goal 3 (Mitigate Risks). It may now be determined that in order to satisfy MD regulations not all of the sub-practices of this CMMI Ò goal will have to be performed. However, in order to satisfy the objectives of RMCM, 6 additional sub-practices have to be added to ensure the safety element of the MD regulations is captured. Table 5 illustrates that specific goal 3 of the CMMI Ò will not be satisfied by following the MD regulations (i.e. performing only the RMCM level Med sub-practices) as only 6 of the 9 CMMI Ò subpractices associated with this CMMI Ò goal are required for RMCM level Med and 2 are superseded by more comprehensive MD practices 33 and 34, respectively. Table 5 includes the complete list of RMCM sub-practices and associated capability levels for developing risk mitigation plans. From mapping the MD regulations against the CMMI Ò for this practice, it was discovered that both IEC:62304 and ISO:14971 request additional sub-practices to those specified by the CMMI Ò . These are: mitigations should be verified and the results of the mitigation verification should be documented. Therefore, 2 additional MD-specific sub-practices were added in order to ensure that the MD RM regulations are adhered to through adopting RMCM. This practice also differed from the previous practices in that two of the CMMI Ò sub-practices are not applicable to the RMCM. Unlike CMMI Ò , the FDA requires that risk mitigation plans and contingency plans be developed for all risks. Therefore, it was necessary to add another 2 sub-practices (developing mitigation for all risks and developing contingency plans for all risks). The introduction of these sub-practices, therefore, overrules the more lightweight CMMI Ò subpractices as they refer to individual and selected risks, whereas the new sub-practice refers to all risks. Table 6 illustrates that developing risk mitigation plans consists of 1 subpractice that is required by both the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations, 2 sub-practices that are required by the CMMI Ò but not by the MD regulations, and 6 sub-practices that are required by the MD regulations but not by the CMMI Ò .
Develop risk mitigation plans
Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI
Ò and the MD regulations (see Table 5 ) Sub-Practice 30. Based upon FDA guidelines the aim of risk mitigation within a MD company is to reduce the severity of the risk, the likelihood of the occurrence or both. Ideally the risk would be eliminated or the severity reduced to a minor level of severity. All residual risk is measured against the criteria defined earlier in the RM strategy. If the criteria are not met, then further risk reducing control measures may be applied. If the criteria are met, then it is still the responsibility of the sponsor of the project to describe and justify any residual risk. ISO:14971 states that if the residual risk is unacceptable and no additional control measures will reduce the risk further, then a risk/benefit analysis must be performed to justify whether the intended use outweighs the residual risk. The evaluation and corresponding data and literature should be included in the RM file. Consequently, the acceptable level of residual risk depends upon the intended purpose of the MD. ISO:14971 also requires that the ''overall residual risk'' for the device be assessed to decide if the overall residual risk is acceptable. This should be documented in the RM file along with any associated data and relevant literature.
5.3.1.2 Sub-practices required by the CMMI Ò but NOT by the MD regulations (see Table 5 ) Sub-Practice 31. The CMMI Ò requires an individual or a group to be given responsibility for addressing each risk; this is not specified in MD software guidelines.
Sub-Practice 32. There is no specific MD guideline requesting that a cost-benefit analysis has to be performed for each risk as compliance with MD safety regulations and not cost is the most important factor. Table 5 ) Sub-Practice 33. Even though the CMMI Ò requires an overall mitigation plan to be in place for each project, there is a difference in the thoroughness of the plan. In the case of the CMMI Ò , risk mitigation plans may not have to be produced for each risk (SEI 2006: RM SP 3.1-1, sub-practice 4). In order to comply with MD guidelines, the manufacturer has to produce a risk control method that will eliminate or reduce the risk to be as low as possible. Risk mitigation plans should be developed for all risks. Therefore, it is necessary to add another sub-practice as follows: developing mitigation plans for all risks.
Sub-practices required by the MD regulations but NOT by the CMMI (see
Sub-Practice 34. The CMMI Ò requests that contingency plans are produced for only selected risks (SEI. 2006: RM SP3.1-1, sub-practice 5). However, as MD guidelines deal with safety, the initial approach is to only permit a product to be manufactured if it is safe, and the remaining risk will not result in injury to the patient, operator and/or bystander. In terms of a contingency plan for such risks, the MD guidelines recommend using protective measures that do not involve user interaction or supplying warning labels, or alternatively a combination of both. It is, therefore, necessary to add another sub-practice as follows: developing contingency plans for all risks.
Sub-Practice 35. IEC:62304 requires that any system requirements related to the control of risks must be added to the requirements document.
Sub-Practice 36. IEC:62304 requires that the MD manufacturer identifies segregation between software items, as this is essential for effective risk control.
Sub-Practices 37 & 38. The IEC:62304 and ISO:14971 guidelines request additional sub-practices to those specified by the CMMI Ò . These are: mitigations should be verified and the results of the mitigation verification should be documented. Therefore, additional sub-practices have to be added to RMCM. Risk mitigations must be verified to ensure the required level of risk reduction has been achieved without introducing new hazards or associated risks. Verification activities must include techniques that ensure the mitigations achieve the desired risk reduction under normal use and foreseeable misuse of the medical device and associated software by the operator. Operator error testing can assist in verifying that the user interface of the software is robust and cannot cause a hazardous condition. Such verification may be performed as part of a pre-release user-trial of the software. Mitigations must also be verified under both normal and fault conditions where the focus is on ensuring the risk reduction techniques are robust enough to withstand potential failures in the associated hardware, operating system and other COTS components and interfaces. The results of all mitigation verification activities must be document as evidence for future inspection. Table 5 includes the complete list of RMCM sub-practices and associated capability levels for developing risk mitigation plans. Both the MD regulatory guidelines and the CMMI Ò require that adequate resources and training must be provided for areas within the software quality domain such as RM. ISO:14971 specifies that the results of the RM activities should be reviewed at defined intervals to check the suitability and effectiveness of the RM process. The CMMI Ò also specifies that performance measures for risk-handling activities are established but adds that a schedule should be produced for resolving each risk. This is not mandated within the MD regulations and is, therefore, labelled as a level 1 sub-practice. Table 5 illustrates that the RMCM practice for implementing risk mitigation plans consists of 4 sub-practices that are required by both the CMMI Ò and the MD regulations (i.e. Level Med), and 1 sub-practice that is required by the CMMI Ò but not by the MD regulations (i.e. Level 1).
Implementing risk mitigation plans
Sub-practices required by BOTH the CMMI
Ò and the MD regulations (see Table 5 ) Sub-Practice 39. Both FDA guidelines and the CMMI Ò require that risks be monitored throughout a project's lifecycle. ISO-14971 specifically states in its scope that ''The requirements of this International Standard are applicable to all stages of the lifecycle of a medical device. '' (ISO 2007) Sub-Practice 40. To comply with MD regulations, a software company is required to demonstrate that all risks may be traced throughout the lifecycle process as per subpractice 39. They must also illustrate the mitigation of risks to an acceptable level and demonstrate completeness in terms of tracking open risk-handling action items to closure. This is also a requirement of CMMI Ò . Sub-Practice 41. Both FDA guidelines and the CMMI Ò require a method to be provided for tracking risk items to closure or to an acceptable level. FDA guidelines specify a number of control methods that may be used either individually or concurrently. The first preference control method is to eliminate the risk or reduce the risk by safe design or redesign. The second preference is to reduce the risk by introducing protective measures within the device itself or manufacturing process that do not require any user action. The third method is to reduce the risk by providing adequate user information (e.g. warnings) and training. This is the least preferable method, as it requires intervention on the part of the MD user. GAMP 4 also suggests further strategies which include: modification of project strategies such as project structure and makeup, increasing testing and complete elimination of the risk driver by changing the expectations or requirements.
The MD manufacturer is required to record the steps taken to eliminate or reduce a risk (e.g. methods adopted) and also record the results of the verification performed to check the effectiveness of the risk control measure. The manufacturer must indicate the severity level of the risk after the risk control method has been implemented and verified. Then a decision is made in relation to comparing the remaining severity level for each risk with the acceptance level associated with that risk. If the resultant risk severity level is not acceptable, then the risk control process will have to be performed again until the risk has been eliminated or the severity level of the risk is deemed acceptable. Additionally, the MD manufacturer is required to perform tests to determine if any new risks have been introduced during the risk control process. If such tests discover any new risks, then the RM process will have to be followed for each of these risks. After all potential risks have been evaluated a final decision is made in relation to the safety of the MD.
Sub-Practice 43. Both FDA and CMMI Ò require that adequate resources and training be provided for areas within the software quality domain such as RM.
Sub-Practice 44. ISO:14971 specifies that the results of the RM activities should be reviewed at defined intervals to check the suitability and effectiveness of the RM process.
Sub-practices required by the CMMI
Ò but NOT by the MD regulations (see Table 5 ) Sub-Practice 42. The CMMI Ò also specifies that performance measures for risk-handling activities are established. Additionally, it requires that a schedule should be produced for resolving each risk. Table 7 provides a summary of the 3 specific goals within the RMCM. There are 44 specific sub-practices of the RMCM. This consists of 24 CMMI Ò and 20 MD-specific subpractices. In order to satisfy the mandatory MD RM requirements, 36 of these sub-practices have to be adhered to (16 CMMI Ò and 20 MD-specific sub-practices). Therefore, level Med of the RMCM contains 36 sub-practices across 3 specific goals.
Summary of the RMCM specific practices
Generic goals and practices
The CMMI Ò also identifies a number of generic goals and practices, and these goals form the basis of the RMCM generic goals. At a fundamental maturity or capability level, it is only necessary to perform the specific base practices. It is interesting to note that MD regulations with respect to RM often have a counterpart in the CMMI Ò . For RM, the generic goals and practices for capability level 2 (GG 2: Institutionalise a Managed Process) are: GP 2.1 Establish Policy; GP 2.2 Plan the process; GP 2.3 Provide Resources; GP 2.4 Assign Responsibility; GP 2.5 Train People; GP 2.6 Manage Configurations; GP 2.7 Identify stakeholders; GP 2.8 M&C Process; GP 2.9 Evaluate Adherence; and GP 2.10 Review.
The FDA regulations state that each manufacturer shall establish the appropriate responsibility, authority and interrelation of all personnel who manage, perform and assess work affecting quality. It also undertakes to ensure that all work is adequately resourced and that staffs are trained. After mapping the MD RM regulations against the CMMI Ò generic goals, it may be determined that in order to satisfy MD regulations that not all of sub-practices of the CMMI Ò generic goals have to be performed. However, 6 out of the 10 practices for goal 2 have to be performed, but none of the practices for goals 3, 4 or 5 are required in order to satisfy MD regulations. This gives a total of 42 required practices when combined with the 36 level Med practices from goal 1. Table 8 illustrates the goals and practices that have to be performed for each of the RMCM generic goals (GG). regulations will only partially meet the goals of this CMMI Ò process area, with only specific goal 1 being fully satisfied. As might reasonably be expected, there is little guidance provided within the MD regulations for the advanced practices of RM. Since failure to perform any specific practice implies failure to meet the specific goal, with respect to the CMMI Ò , it is clear that the goals of RM within CMMI Ò cannot be obtained by satisfying the MD regulations during software development. However, the RMCM shows that 36 specific sub-practices would have to be performed in order to satisfy MD regulations and that only an additional 8 sub-practices would be required in order to satisfy all the CMMI Ò level 1 (or RMCM level 1) requirements. But is the opposite true, can meeting the CMMI Ò goals for RM successfully meet the MD software regulations? Meeting the goals of the RM process area by performing the CMMI Ò specific practices would not meet the requirements of the MD software regulations in this area as an additional 20 MD-specific sub-practices have to be added to meet the objectives of RMCM. However, companies wishing to further improve their RM practices and fulfil all the RM goals and practices required by the CMMI Ò may adopt the 18 additional RMCM sub-practices.
Results
Implementation of RMCM
Through an action research project, the RMCM was implemented by the MD organisation for two years on two embedded and three desktop software projects. The company used the RMCM to identify what risk management practices they were missing. They then updated their own internal standard operating procedures (how to roadmap) and templates to address the missing practices. The updated procedures were released into the company's quality management system and implemented across the aforementioned projects. After a period of time, a re-assessment was performed against the RMCM model to check that all the practices were now being satisfied.
Prior to the introduction of the RMCM, 9 out of the 36 required base practices (i.e. level Med practices with SG1 to SG3) were adequately addressed by the company's standard operating procedures and design templates. Twenty-seven were found to be missing and one was insufficient in that it only partially met the requirement laid out by the RMCM for the practice. The implementation of RMCM has had a positive effect on the MD client company. It provided them with a single reference point for determining their RM practice capability, enabling them to quickly identify what practices were missing or inadequate. They also have a source to refer to when addressing missing practices deemed essential by the MD regulators in achieving safe and efficient software. Our research confirmed that all 6 practices required to satisfy level Med for Generic Goal 2 of the RMCM had been met, although initially the software risk process satisfied 15 of the 42 required regulatory practices, i.e. the 42 practices is the total of the specific and generic practices that is obtained from adding the number of ''CMMI Ò Activities required to meet regulatory requirements' ' (22) to the number of ''Additional Activities required to meet regulatory requirements'' (20), see Table 9 . Whilst establishing the policy, planning the process, providing resources, assigning responsibility, training people and identifying stakeholders were ineffective, the RM procedure satisfies all required practices (Burton et al. 2008) .
Following the implementation of the RMCM, both the MD company and peers in the software community have highlighted the requirements for an additional practice to be added to future iterations of the RMCM. In MD systems that include complex human interfaces, it can be inherently difficult to predict how end-users will operate the system. As operator experience increases, they may discover techniques for accomplishing their tasks quicker, and this in turn may uncover latent defects and previously unidentified risks. Pre-production user-trials involving substantial operating testing across the full range of the software's functionality could be used as a method to assist in the identification of such defects and associated risks. During the user-trials, operators would be given enough time to become thoroughly familiar with the system and be encouraged to try different techniques for accomplishing their tasks within the bounds of the intended system functionality. This process includes the advantage of uncovering the latent defects and risks as well as providing a basis for improving the operator interface.
Conclusions and future work
This research has made a number of contributions. It has investigated how thorough current MD regulations are in relation to specifying what RM practices MD companies should adopt when developing software. This was achieved through performing a mapping between the MD regulations and the CMMI Ò guidelines for RM. We discovered that the guidelines specified in the MD regulations will at best, only partially meet the goals of this CMMI Ò process area. However, we cannot state that the CMMI Ò guidelines for RM are more thorough than those specified in the MD regulations as 20 additional sub-practices are required in order to satisfy the MD regulatory requirements associated within RM. We also identified the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CMMI Ò RM process area in the specific context of MD software.
Secondly, we developed a Risk Management Capability Model (RMCM) for the MD software industry. This model consists of 7 levels of capability. This model will assist MD companies to improve their existing RM practices and provide them with a pathway to achieving CMMI Ò certification which could provide them with an advantage in a competitive market-place.
As a result of this research, three additional questions now require resolving. First, will MD companies react favourably to adopting the RMCM? Second, what impact will this model have upon RM practices and MD software quality, safety and reliability within the MD industry? Third, should similar SPI models be developed for other process areas that are pivotal to the development of MD software? We intend to address these three questions through performing further research.
As discussed in Sect. 7, we have implemented this model through an action research cycle in one MD organisation. Next, we plan to trial this model within more MD companies. Our vision is to provide a complete SPI framework that is specifically tailored to the needs of the MD industry. This SPI framework will consist of a capability model for each process area that is relevant to the development of software within the MD software industry (RMCM will be one of these capability models). RMCM will support MD companies in pursuing a continuous SPI path that will produce more efficient software development and safer medical devices in compliance with regulatory requirements.
As safety is a primary issue for medical device software, we are planning to extend this work to incorporate the safety integrity levels and the safety life cycle from the international IEC 61508 (IEC 2006-1) standard for the ''functional safety'' of electrical, electronic and programmable equipment as well as the safety processes that are present in ?SAFE (SEI 2007) . We also plan to investigate how this research could be integrated with: the safety-critical standards that are used within other domains, e.g. the RTCA DO-178B (RTCA 1992) standard that has been adopted successfully by the aviation industry to raise the level of software safety and robustness in embedded software; the EN 51028 (EN 2008) standard that is used in the railway industry; the IEC/ISO 15026 (IEC 1998) 
